We estimate the effect of two rounds of gender quotas, in 2007 and in 2011, on the election of female politicians and on public finance decisions in Spanish municipalities, using a Before-After Regression Discontinuity Design. Gender quotas have raised the percentage of female candidates and also, but to a lower extent, the percentage of female councilors. The difference between the two effects is due to the strategic positioning of candidates within lists. The share of women who are head of an electoral list increased as a result of the quotas, but the share of female mayors has been unaffected. We do not find any evidence of an effect of gender quotas on the size and composition of expenditures, despite there being survey evidence of gender differences in preferences over policy.
Introduction
It is a well established fact that, despite the large and persistent increase in female labor market participation in the last twenty years, women have failed to achieve comparable levels of participation in politics. According to the 2011 Edition of the Global Gender Gap Report, in the US the female to male ratio of labor force participation is equal to 0.85, whereas the female to male ratio of presence in parliament is equal to 0.20. In Spain, the country we will focus on in this paper, these numbers are 0.77 and 0.58, respectively.
The use of electoral quotas has become a popular way of improving women's access to governing bodies and around half of the countries in the world today use some type of electoral quota when electing their parliaments (Dahlerup, 2005) . Among the arguments for the introduction of gender quotas, a prominent one is that the preferences of wome may be given less weight than those of men in male-dominated policy making. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) indeed show that female politicians in India make systematically different decisions than male ones, reflecting gender differences in preferences over policies. However,to date,there is not any credible evidence on the effect of gender quotas on policy-making in developed countries.
This paper attempts to estimate the causal effect of gender quotas on both the number and the selection of elected female politicians and on local government decisions in Spain, using a BeforeAfter Regression Discontinuity Design (Before-After RDD henceforth). In general, these effects are hard to identify, because the settings where quotas are adopted and where they are not often differ in ways that are correlated with the outcomes studied. Gender quotas are, for example, likely to be adopted when there is a trend favoring female political participation, and these trends may directly affect the number of elected female politicians and policy. The Law 3/2007, which introduced legislated candidate gender quotas in Spain, offers a unique source of exogenous variation in gender quotas. This law prescribes that both genders be represented in at least 40% of every five positions on municipal electoral lists. In 2007, municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants were exempt from the law, and the population threshold was lowered to 3,000 in 2011: this allows us to exploit an RDD. The empirical strategy applied in this paper compares differences between pre-reform and post-reform outcomes, examining municipalities just below and just above the relevant population threshold, during two rounds of application of gender quotas, in 2007 and in 2011.
The first part of the paper investigates the effect of gender quotas on the percentage of female candidates and elected politicians. According to our estimates, at their first round of application, the gender quotas increased the percentage of female elected councilors in Spanish municipalities by about 17% with respect to the pre-quota average percentage. Interestingly, the percentage of female candidates increased more than the percentage of female councilors. This difference arises due to a strategic positioning of candidates, where women were systematically placed at the bottom of every five positions on voting lists. These results are consistent with recent empirical findings in the political economy literature on strategic positioning of candidates (Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012) . For similar reasons, the gender quota did not significantly affect the share of female mayors, since mayors are indirectly elected and are in practice always the first name on each list. 1 Finally, there is no evidence of dynamics in the effect of gender quotas: in 2011, we fail to find any difference in the share of female candidates and of female councilors in municipalities that were at their second round of applications of quotas (above 5,000), versus those that were adopting them for the first time (below 5,000).
The second part of the paper analyzes the effect of gender quotas on policy making. To what extent can legislated candidate gender quotas allow a better representation of women's preferences?
There are different reasons to suspect that their effect could be null. Parties change the strategic positioning of women on electoral lists, in order to minimize the probability that female councilors are elected, thus diluting the effect of the reform and signaling a discriminatory behavior toward women. Moreover, there is no increase in the probability that women are elected to mayoral positions; this is particular relevant in the Spanish institutional setting, characterized by the prominent role of municipal mayors (Sweeting, 2009) . Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) , one can also conjecture that male elites invest to increase the de facto power in the hands of the mayor and of the party leaders, given that their de jure power to control the pool of candidates is undermined by gender quotas; this would minimize the influence of female councilors on policy making. Consistent with the above arguments, using different population thresholds and two rounds of application of the quota, we find no evidence that the gender quota made municipal policy more aligned with female preferences. This is in contrast to Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) , who, however, study the effect on the policy of reserving the most important seat in Indian villages for a woman. While the null effect on policy could also be caused by similar preferences among women and men, we actually find evidence of differences across gender in the response of Spanish citizens to surveys on values and attitudes.
It could be that the competition for political power is so strong that the preferences of politicians are of no importance for policy making, only the preferences of voters matter (as in the Downsian model of electoral competition). If this was the case, electing a female mayor should have no effect on municipal policy. We plan to examine this hypothesis, by studying the effect on policy of electing a female mayor. Given the proportional electoral system in Spanish municipalities, we use quasi-random variation generated by the close assignment of one additional seat to a list headed by a woman.
The paper most closely related to ours is Casas-Arce and Saiz (2011). They exploit the introduction of gender quotas in Spain to infer the causes of low female participation in politics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the background to the research questions investigated. Section 3 describes the policy analyzed and the Spanish institutional context in terms of electoral law and government responsibilities at the local level. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy and Section 5 presents the data. Section 6 analyzes the results. Section 7 discusses the assumption needed for a causal interpretation of the estimates and Section 8 concludes the paper.
Conceptual Framework and Background
The investigation of the effect of gender quotas on the election of female politicians relates to a number of existing studies. The paper that is most closely related to mine is De Paola, Scoppa, and Lombardo (2010); they estimate a positive effect of legislated candidate gender quotas on the percentage of female councilors in Italian municipalities. The institutional context of their study is, however,different than mine, which may be of importance for the functioning of quotas, as emphasized in Norris (2006) . First, the so-called preference vote (voto di preferenza) is allowed in Italy, which means that voters can express an explicit preference for a candidate on a list; Spain instead has a closed list system, which allows me to investigate how party leaders reoptimize their placement strategies in response to the introduction of gender quotas. Second, I estimate what impact gender quotas have on the indirect election of mayors, whereas De Paola, Scoppa, and Lombardo (2010) look at direct elections.
In more recent work, Baltrunaite, Bello, Casarico, and Profeta (2012) analyze the effect of the introduction of gender quotas on the quality of elected politicians in Italy; they find that their average educational level increases because more female politicians, who are on average more educated than men, are elected, and because men at the lowest tail of the educational distribution are no longer elected. Besley et al. (2012) show that a "zipper" candidate gender quota voluntarily introduced by the Social Democratic party in Sweden raised the competence of men in municipalities where the initial share of women was low.
Given its focus on the effect of gender quotas on policy, this paper is also closely related to the work of Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) . However, there are some important differences between these two studies. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) estimate the effect on policy of the reservation of seats for heads of Village Councils; these reserved positions are defined as the only powerful ones at the village level. Clearly, the effects of legislated candidate quotas for the election of a legislature that makes decisions with majority rule can be very different, as opposed to the effects of seat reservation. As noted by Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) , legislators negotiate with colleagues over the passing of legislation, so a modest increase in the number of legislators may not be sufficient to change policy, and large shocks to the gender composition of the legislature would be needed.
More broadly, this work is related to the literature on the effect of female politicians on policy outcomes. However, the introduction of gender quotas has different implications for policy formation with respect to the close election of female legislators, which is the focus of most of this literature.
Effects of gender quotas on policy could arise through changes in the gender composition of the legislature, but also by inducing general changes in women's participation in politics: women's presence in political parties, female turnout, involvement in public debates and lobbying. How these changes map into policy changes depends on the political process.
Starting with the effects through the gender composition of the legislature, two useful benchmarks are the Citizen Candidate Model (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) and the Downsian Electoral Competition Model (Downs, 1957) . The former predicts that the preferences of politicians are of importance for policy making and the latter that they do not. The empirical evidence regarding which model is a better description of the actual policy choice is mixed.
A number of papers find that the preferences of politicians are of importance in developing countries (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011) , whereas Rehavi (2007) , Svaleryd (2009) and Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) present mixed evidence in developed countries. This framework also applies to research on the effects on policy of other legislator characteristics, such as the party of affiliation in Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) and female children in Washington (2008) .
The effect of legislators' identity on policy making also depends on the type of legislative bargaining model that is implied; see Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . Female politicians may have a larger effect on policy outcomes if they can access positions with agenda setting power, such as mayor, deputy-mayor, or member of the Cabinet. They may also have a larger bargaining power if the agenda setters (i.e. the mayor and the party leaders) did not have the power to end their political career by placing them outside a closed list.
Finally, the effect of the increase in the number of female legislators on policy outcomes depends on the ability of the male elite to invest in de facto power, in order to offset the partial loss in de jure power caused by the gender quota (see Robinson, 2006, 2008) ). Summarizing, although related to a number of theoretical and empirical studies on gender quotas and on legislators' identity and policy outcomes, this paper is the first to investigate whether candidate gender quotas change policy in a direction which is more aligned to female preferences; it also provides new evidence on the effect of gender quotas on women's access to positions of power, in an institutional context different from that in previous work.
Understanding the potential of legal candidate quotas to change the policy outcomes is crucial given that policy change is at the core of the pro-quota arguments, and given that legal candidate quotas are increasingly being applied in both developing and developed countries. 2 2 According to Quota Project, Global Database of Quotas for Women, the following countries have adopted legislated candidate quotas at the sub-national level: Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Macedonia, France, Greece, Honduras, Republic of Korea, Mauritania, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Uruguay, Uzbekistan. The Italian Council of Ministry did in March 2011 approve a Legislative Decree that prescribes the introduction of candidate gender quotas in municipal elections in Italy; in particular, the decree prescribes that each gender cannot represent more than two thirds of the candidate lists. In order to study the effect of gender quotas on policy making at the municipal level, it is important to understand the organization of local government in Spain. This is mainly disciplined by the Law 7/1985 (Ley Reguladora de las Bases de Regimen Local ). According to this law, municipalities are administered and governed by the municipal council, which is composed of the municipal councilors, elected in free elections every four years, and the mayor, usually also the leader of the majority coalition and elected by the municipal councilors. The division of power between municipal councilors and the mayor is such that the latter can more effectively affect policy making.
Municipal councilors are entitled to the control and supervision of the governing bodies, the approval of instruments of general planning, regulations and ordinances, the approval of the budget, the disposal of expenditure in different fields of competence, and the roll-call vote of confidence on the mayor. Nevertheless, the mayor appears to be the dominant figure in local politics. She convenes and chairs the meetings of the plenary assembly of municipal councilors and of the cabinet and casts the deciding vote in the case of ties, disposes expenditures within the limits of her competence, heads the municipal staff and as such approves appointments, sanctions and dismissals, heads the municipal police, approves instruments of development planning not explicitly attributed to the municipal councilors and instruments of urban management and urbanization projects, approves construction projects if they are part of the municipal budget, grants licenses, and orders the publication and enforcement of the decisions of the municipal council. Moreover, she appoints mayoral deputies and cabinet members, and formal rules allow her to remove them at any point in time. 3 This last feature confers a great deal of power to the mayor, because mayoral deputies and cabinet members prepare the general plan of the council and the municipal budget under the mayor's guidance; the general plan and the budget are then subject to the municipal council for approval. This means that the mayor and the other people whom she appoints are the agenda setters for the determination and allocation of expenditures. Sweeting (2009) analyzes formal and informal rules that regulate the decision-making process at the municipality level in Spain and he concludes that the mayor remains dominant over the Cabinet. 4 An important feature of the decision-making process described by Sweeting (2009) is the strict party discipline that seems to be imposed on party members who vote in the Municipal Council and in the Cabinet. A mayor interviewed by Sweeting states: "Legally they could [vote against the group] but they would be reprimanded by the party. We could not remove them from the Town Hall, but we could separate them from the government. I could take their competences away from them" Interestingly, Sweeting (2009) argues that the closed list system strengthens this practice, because councilors feel that they have been elected due to their party membership, rather than due to their individual characteristics, and therefore they vote following the party directives rather than their individual attitudes. Moreover, the degree of authority attributed to the mayor by the formal rules on decision making is enriched by the informal rules about the formation of the lists. The first person on the list (running for the mayoral position) is chosen first; after that, the other candidates and their order are determined, and it is reported that the mayor "always gets what he wants". Therefore, Sweeting observes that "the mayor can reward loyal members by moving them up the list, and penalize others".
From the institutional details provided above, it can be seen that the mayor has a crucial role in decision-making, due to both formal and informal rules; among the former, the power to set the agenda in decisions over the allocation of expenditures and the power to appoint the other agenda setters are the most relevant; among the latter, the practice that gives a great deal of authority to the mayor in deciding the positions on the list is also extremely important.
Given this, one would not expect a substantial change in policy resulting from the introduction of legislated candidate gender quotas, unless they promote more women to the position of mayor, or unless a large shock to the gender composition of parties and Municipal councilors is brought about, changing the informal rules within parties. 5 Moreover, given that the male elite of local party leaders (from the pool of which the mayoral candidate is likely to be selected) sees its de jure power being diluted by the introduction of gender quotas, it may increase its investment in de facto power, exercising more authority in decisions over the positioning of candidates, and increasing 4 Sweeting reports some statements by people involved in local politics in Spain whom he directly interviewed, as the followings: "The mayor has all the powers, all of them...by law, only the first Deputy mayor has the power to substitute for the mayor through illness or incapacity. But the mayor has the power to sack the first Deputy mayor"; "All the powers are with the mayor. If the mayor delegates, to a councilor say, citizen security, at any moment he can revoke it. And that has nothing to do with the full council; "Municipalities are presidential. Central government Ministers have weight. That does not happen locally".
5 This would be more a long-term process anyway. Robinson (2006, 2008) , though in reference to a different context, would reinforce the mechanism through which gender quotas fail to promote policy change.
Empirical Strategy
In the absence of randomization, it is hard to identify the causal effect of gender quotas on the outcomes of interest. Municipalities that self-select into an electoral system with quotas are systematically different from those that do not, and these differences are likely to be correlated with the outcomes that I want to investigate. Ideally, I would prefer to randomly assign gender quotas to different municipalities. While this is not possible in the context studied here, the RDD combined with the Before-After strategy that I present below provides a close approximation to the ideal experiment, allowing me to credibly claim that the allocation of gender quotas is "as good as randomly assigned".
The standard RDD allows the identification of the effect of gender quotas if other variables do not change sharply at the population threshold that is relevant, in Spain, for the application of gender quotas (5,000 in 2007 and 3,000 in 2011). To the best of our knowledge, there are no other policy changes at the threshold of 3,000 inhabitants. However, this is not the case for the 5,000 threshold, which is relevant for the application of other laws. Most importantly, the services provided by the Municipal Council vary depending on the size of the population (see Table 1 ). 6 7
However, these laws existed before the Equality Law that was passed in 2007. For this reason, while at the 3,000 threshold we can use a standard RDD, at the threshold of 5,000 we need to combine the RDD with a before-after comparison.
Let Y it be the outcome of interest. We estimate the following equation:
where P op it is population in the pre-elections year, P op5000 it is a dummy for municipalities with P op it > 5000, Af ter it is a dummy for the post-reform period and Quota it is the interaction term between P op5000 it and Af ter it , i.e. Quota it = 1 if P op5000 it = 1 and Af ter it = 1. The function ϕ N is defined as follows: let σ = {γ, δ} and k = {1, P op5000 it }; ϕ N (σ, k, P op it )=Σ N n=1 σ n kP op n it . β 3 is the Before-After RD parameter, estimating the effect of gender quotas on the outcomes of interest.
We estimate equation (1) for N={1, 2, 3, 4} on bandwidths equal to ±4000 (0.80), ±1000 (0.20), and ±500 (0.10). This deals with Lee and Lemieux (2010) concern that an estimation on the whole sample controlling for a polynomial in the running variable would provide global estimates of the regression function over all values of X, while the RD identification is based on estimates of the regression function at the threshold; Lee and Lemieux suggest a polynomial approach only as a robustness check for local linear estimates.
In equation (1), we allow the slope of the polynomial to be different on the two sides of the threshold, but I constrain it to be identical on each side before and after the reform. An inspection of the data for some outcome variables shows that this is a plausible constraint. However, following Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2011) , I also estimate a more flexible version of equation (1), allowing the slope of the polynomials to be different on the two sides of the threshold and also across the two periods; in practice, I fit four polynomials. The estimated equation is:
where the function ϕ N is defined as for equation (1) with:
and k = {1, P op5000 it , Af ter it , P op5000 it Af ter it } Given equation (1), and defining:
which is the average causal effect of gender quotas on the dependent variable,
the assumptions that the effect of gender quotas is homogeneous across different population levels and E[ε it |, P op5000 it = 1, Af ter it = 1, Γ N (P op it )] = 0. The latter condition requires that there are no time-varying, non-controlled for characteristics specific to municipalities with a population just above 5,000 and correlated with the outcome of interest.
In Section 7 we present some robustness checks to show that the necessary conditions for the validity of this assumption are met.
Data

Municipal Councils Data
We apply the empirical strategy described above to a sample of Spanish municipalities. 
Local Budget Data
Data on budget size and the composition of expenditures in Spanish municipalities are available at the Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda website. We use two variables for government size, measuring the revenue and the expenditure side, respectively. We follow the classification in the official data which breaks down expenditure into functional categories, reflecting the responsibilities of the Town Council listed in Law 7/1985. Budget data for 2008-2010, 2004-2005, and 2012-2013 are merged, respectively, with election data for 2011, 2007 and 2003. 
Results
In this preliminary version of the paper, we comment on results only for the first round of application of the quotas, in 2007
Gender Quotas and Female Politicians
The research design presented in Section 4 allows estimation of the causal effect of the gender quotas introduced in 2007 on the percentage of female councilors elected to Spanish municipalities.
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 2 . In all tables with regression results, I report the estimates of Equation (1) in columns (1)-(2), for N = {1, 2, 3, 4}; in columns (3) and (4) I report the coefficients from the estimation of the augmented version of Equation (1) (6) and it is not statistically significant; the effect of gender quotas 10 I do not restrict the bandwidth below 0.80 when I allow the polynomial to differ on the two sides of the threshold and across periods, because the number of observations may be too low to efficiently fit this model; I only report the linear estimates on the 0.10 bandwidth, as a robustness check for the estimates on the 0.80 bandwidth.
11 The goodness of fit test I use is proposed in Lee and Lemieux (2010) : I run the regressions estimated in Table 2 controlling for 200 inhabitants bin dummies. Then, I interpret joint significance of the dummies as a rejection of the model. on the election of female councilors is too small and noisy to be precisely estimated with a very flexible model using a relatively low number of observations.
In Table 3 , I present the estimates for the same equations but with the percentage of female candidates as the dependent variable. Using the Akaike criterion and the goodness of fit test, as above, to select the most reliable coefficients, I estimate a positive effect of gender quotas on the percentage of female candidates, which falls between 7.59 and 8.89 points.
Gender quotas caused an increase in the percentage of female candidates and in the percentage of female councilors in Spanish municipalities. This shows that gender quotas are binding, and they reach one of the objectives they are adopted for, which is a larger presence of women in politics. 13 I drop candidates in positions higher than 10 from the sample, and I estimate the female and male probabilities of being in each position conditional on being positioned in the first 10.
14 I cannot exclude that there will be a long-term effect on attitudes, as is shown in Beaman et al. (2009) Overall, the fact that, although to different extents, the two major parties in the Spanish political arena use strategic positioning to increase the probability that male candidates will be elected shows that voters do not sanction this behavior; otherwise it would be optimal for the parties to propose a more balanced distribution of female and male candidates within the five position blocks.
What is the effect of gender quotas on the election of female mayors? Spanish mayors are elected indirectly by the Municipal councilors and the person elected is the first candidate on the list of the party with an absolute majority, or the first candidate on one of the lists of the parties forming a majority coalition. Given the strategic positioning documented in Table 4 , gender quotas most likely have a null effect on the election of female mayors. I estimate Equations (1) and (2) with the dependent variable being a dummy for female mayor. The regression results are presented in Table   6 and graphical evidence is also provided in Figure 3 . The coefficient of Quota is not precisely estimated and switches signs across different specifications; the evidence in Figure 3 suggests that there is no effect of gender quotas on the election of female mayors. This is consistent with the evidence on strategic positioning and with the claim in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) that India's initial implementation of a reservation policy which assigned one-third of the seats on Village Councils to women was not successful because it did not substantially increase the proportion of female pradhans, the most important position in the local government.
This finding suggests that the Spanish experience with gender quotas can partly be regarded as disappointing. As argued in Section 3, Spanish law gives agenda setting powers to the mayor, which suggests that a female mayor could ensure representation of female preferences in policy decisions more than female councilors; also the position of mayor in Spain is the most prestigious one in the local government, which means that the increase in the number of female mayors may be more effective in breaking down the negative stereotypes related to women in politics than the increase in the number of female councilors (see the case of the election of female Pradhans in India in Beaman et al., 2009). Therefore, gender quotas in Spain are most likely a missed opportunity for a change in policy and in attitudes toward female policy-makers.
In the next section, I will directly study the effect on policy, looking at local budget data.
De Paola et al. (2010).
15 The Socialist Party has had internal quotas since the 1990s, which may in part explain the observed difference across the two parties. Tables 7, 8 Using the Akaike criterion and the goodness of fit test to select the most preferred models, I
Gender Quotas and Policy Outcomes
Estimation Results
estimate that municipalities with quotas experienced between a 1% decrease and a 0.3% increase in expenditures per capita, and between a 3% and a 4.6% decrease in revenues per capita. 16 A null of zero effect can thus not be rejected, which is confirmed by Figure 4 . Figure 4 plots the differences in the outcome variables against population, after and before the reform. A second-order polynomial is fit to the data on the two sides of the threshold. The same procedure is applied in Figures 5 and   6 .
The coefficients of expenditure composition are in general small and not statistically significant, as is also shown in Figures 5 and 6 . Two sets of estimates deserve further analysis. First, I find a positive effect of gender quotas on expenditures for social promotion when I estimate Equation (1) on the 0.10 bandwidth and Equation (2) on the 0.80 bandwidth for N = {2, 3}. However, this result is not robust to alternative specifications, as shown in Table 8 . Moreover, there is no evidence of a jump at the threshold in Figure 5 ; the estimated effect is thus likely to be driven by noisiness in the data. Second, I estimate a negative effect of gender quotas on the fraction of expenditures for the regulation of the production sector, in a subset of specifications. According to my estimates, the introduction of gender quotas caused a decrease in expenditures for the regulation of the production sector equal to 0.8 percentage points. Given that, in 2003, the expenditures per capita were on average equal to 935 euros, and that on average about 1% of the total expenditures is allocated to the regulation of the production sector, this coefficient translates into a negligible number in terms of euros per capita. It is also hard to detect a sizeable decrease in this category of expenditures from the Before-After RD graph in Figure 6 . (2004) studied the effect of reserving the most effective seat in Indian local politics , the one with executive power. 17 , while the reform studied in this paper has no statistically significant effect on the percentage of women holding mayoral office. Moreover, female legislators could have more autonomy of decision over policy if their future political career did not depend on the agenda 16 The results are not precisely estimated, if not on the largest bandwidths, which should be used as a robustness check rather than to make causal statements on the relationship between two variables (see Lee and Lemieux 2010) .
17 Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) quote Kanago's (1998) statement that the position of Pradhan reserved to women in one third of the villages is "the only one that yields effective power".
setter, who can decide to put them at the bottom of the list in the next elections; this suggests that the change in the gender composition of the legislature may have failed to improve the representation of female preferences because the closed list system attributes a great deal of authority to party leaders, and gender quotas do not limit their influence on policy-making. Moreover, possibly a critical percentage of women in the Municipal Council or among the decision-makers at the party level is necessary to change the informal rules that regulate politics in Spanish municipalities.
Finally, party leaders in the 2007 municipal elections decided on the order of the candidates on the list so as to minimize the probability that a woman was elected, given the constraints imposed by gender quotas. This documents a discriminatory behavior toward female candidates (that can be either statistical or taste-based), and it shows that the male elite disposes of and uses its de facto power to dominate municipal politics, despite the introduction of gender quotas.
Beside these features of the institutional setting that made me predict no effect of gender quotas on policy, the difference between the result in this paper and that in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) can be justified in two alternative ways. First, the socio-economic context of the policy change in this paper is different than that in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) , suggesting that there may be differences in terms of politicians' incentives and characteristics and in terms of the process of policy formation which, in Spain, may be better described by the "median voter model" than by the "citizens candidates model". If this hypothesis is true, the argument that gender quotas improve representation because male dominated legislative bodies do not properly represent women's points of view is not supported in the case of Spain. Second, preferences over policy across genders may be more aligned in Spain than in rural India.
While I am not able to rule out that the null effect is a "median voter" result, I can exclude that policy preferences in Spain are perfectly homogeneous across genders, because I document gender differences by looking at survey data on values and attitudes; the results of this analysis are shown in the next section. 18
Gender Preferences in Spain
I rely on two surveys that ask questions that can be directly or indirectly linked to policy outcomes. The first is the Spanish Barometro, which is administered by the Centro de Investigationes Sociologicas and covers 2,500 people across Spain concerning their opinions on various topics.
I use the responses to some of the questions in the June 2008 Barometro survey, and I find 18 A further explanation for the null effect could be an issue of data quality, meaning that the classification of expenditures is too coarse to capture changes resulting from the gender composition of the Municipal Council. However, the rather broad categories used are dominated by a small set of areas of expenditures, as shown by the aggregated data at the national level. General expenditures consist of expenditures for the general administration for 85% of their value in municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants; social promotion only includes educational promotion and promotion of employment; 78% of the expenditures on infrastructure go to highways, roads and urban public roads; the different voices under social goods can be reconducted to mainly three categories of expenditures: health and education (14%), expenditures for housing and urbanism (30%) and interventions for the cleanliness, organization and beauty of towns (38%). Therefore, the functional division of expenditures should be narrow enough to capture the effect of changes in the gender composition of the Municipal Council. Nevertheless, I am currently working on collecting more disaggregated expenditure data.
evidence of gender differences in preferences over specific issues. The first question asks respondents to rank the three problems that they considered to have the largest effect on Spain at the time of the questionnaire. Respondents were given 31 options. I compare the probabilities that women and men rank some of the issues proposed in the first place, selecting among those of the greatest concern to the majority of the people surveyed, and those where we would expect gender differences given the findings in the literature. 19 Table 10 shows that there are statistically significant gender differences in the degree of concern over quality of housing, healthcare and violence against women. Moreover, when asked what problem affects them most, men are significantly more likely than women to indicate "unemployment" (17% vs. 14%), while women are significantly more likely than men to answer "housing" (9% vs 11%). This may reflect the differences in how men and women spend their time. Respondents were asked to indicate their main working day activity from seven alternatives; the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null of equality of the empirical distribution of the answers across gender with men being more likely to work, and women being more likely to be housewives and to look after children, a fairly standard division of roles in Southern European societies, and one that might explain women's greater concern about housing quality. Another remarkable difference emerges in the work-life balance. Respondents were asked to express their agreement with one of two statements: "Conciliation of work and family life is an issue that has to be solved between employers and employees, and where public intervention would be useless" and "Governments should adopt measures such that firms are sympathetic to work-family life balance issues". Women are significantly more likely to agree with the second statement (1 is agreement with the first statement; 2 agreement with the second; the average score for men is 1.72, while for women it is 1.78). Moreover, men favor more traditional divisions of tasks in the family, with a larger preference for models where one of the two parents works -or works more, and the other stays at home -or works less and dedicates his/her time to the children (on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 is the most equal division and 3 the most unequal, men score 1.53 on average and women score Spain in the following ten years, from four alternatives. While the distribution of women's and men's opinion on the first goal was the same (see Table 11 ), a two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows statistically significant differences for the second ranked goal. These differences seem to mainly be driven by women's higher preferences for "try to make our cities more beautiful" (see Table 12 ). Also in answer to the question "If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important?", from the four choices, women are significantly more likely than men to choose "fighting inflation" (39% vs 34%). More generally, women and men display different preferences in relation to politics: women are statistically significantly less interested in politics, are significantly less likely to report participation in political activity, but have more confidence in 19 See Rehavi (2008) for a review of the findings on gender differences in policy preferences. 20 All differences are statistically significant at 1%. 21 The survey was conducted in 2007 in Spain.
women's movement, are more likely to think that discrimination against women is the most serious problem in the world (9% vs 13%) and are less likely to think that income is the most important characteristic of a good job (32% vs 27%).
Further Discussion of the Identification Strategy
The RDD estimates on the reduced sample have a causal interpretation, if there are no notaccounted for differences across municipalities on either side of the threshold, which are correlated with the outcome being explained. McCrary (2008) shows that this is equivalent to requiring that the forcing variable is not discontinuous at the cutoff as a consequence of manipulation, i.e. that every town has the same ex-ante probability of being on one side or the other of the cutoff.
In my two-period setting, this condition can be relaxed, as it is sufficient to require that the ex-ante probability of being at either side of the cutoff does not change differentially across municipalities above and below the threshold in 2006.
McCrary (2008) proposes a test for the plausibility of the assumption of non-manipulation. The idea behind this test is that continuity of the conditional density of the running variable X at the cutoff implies continuity of the density of X, under the assumption of monotonicity of the benefits from the treatment. Figure 7 shows the result of the McCrary test with the discontinuity at 5,000; the test is run on municipalities with a population below the 99th percentile. Using a bandwidth equal to 1,000 inhabitants to fit the polynomial and bins of 200 inhabitants, I cannot reject the null of no discontinuity at the threshold. However, this result is not robust to alternative specifications, as shown in Figure 8 , which uses a bandwidth equal to 2,000. Larger bandwidths produce similar results to those depicted in Figure 8 . Thus, the McCrary test is not conclusive. Moreover, the presence of the discontinuity is not sufficient to claim that there was manipulation at the threshold, because a precisely estimated jump may result randomly from noisy data. However, when I run the McCrary test on different cutoffs (points along a grid with a minimum value equal to 200, a maximum value equal to 10,000 and delta equal to 200) there are only four points where I estimate a statistically significant difference (see Figure 9 ). This suggests that it is unlikely that the discontinuity estimated at 5,000 is random. 22 If there were manipulation, it should be noted that it is not related to the application of the legislated quota, which was approved in March 2007, while the data refer to the population in January 2006. The discontinuity indeed appears also if I run the McCrary test on 2002 population 22 I contacted the Spanish Statistical Office to ask for a clarification of this observed discontinuity. In addition to ruling out manipulation of data by Municipal Councils, the Spanish Statistical Office provided detailed documents describing the procedure it follows before population data are declared to be official. However, some manipulation could occur completely within the rules if, for instance, a mayor were to encourage relatives and/or friends to strategically change their place of residence. For instance, it was reported in the newspaper ElPais on April 1th 2011, that the mayor of a town in the comarca of Xinzo had admitted that some citizens had moved their place of residence to his town for electoral purposes.
data (see Figure 7 and Figure 8) . 23 This is relevant because, as anticipated, the condition that needs to be satisfied in a dynamic setting is that the discontinuity does not change at the time when the quota is introduced. Table 13 shows that the population data I use for my analysis satisfy this requirement. 24 As a further check of the identification strategy, I run placebo regressions where I estimate
Equations (1) and (2) on data for 2001-2002 (before) and 2005-2006 (after) . There is no evidence of systematic differential trends across municipalities above and below the threshold before gender quotas were introduced. While some estimates could point toward a (non robust) positive effect of being above the threshold on expenditures and revenues per capita, before-after RD graphs do not corroborate this result (tables and graphs are available upon request).
Finally, in the spirit of randomized experiments, I test whether covariates are balanced at either side of the threshold within the 20% bandwidth, choosing variables and time-lags depending on data availability. Table 14 shows that there are no statistically significant differences in the means of these covariates.
Overall, while the reliability of my empirical strategy depends on a fundamentally untestable assumption, the tests presented in this section, and knowledge of the particular institutional context allow me to argue that I have estimated the causal effect of gender quotas on the election of female politicians and public finance decisions.
Conclusion
In this paper, I used a Before-After RD design to estimate the effect of legislated candidate gender quotas on the election of female politicians and on public finance decisions in Spanish municipalities.
The identification strategy is based on the application of a double-quota only in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants in the 2007 municipal elections. I conducted a graphical and regression based analysis of the effect of gender quotas on the outcomes of interest.
According to my estimates, gender quotas caused an increase in female councilors in Spain of 6 percentage points, while the increase in female candidates was 8-9 percentage points. Gender quotas had no significant effect on the percentage of female mayors.
The difference between the increase in the percentage of female candidates and that in the percentage of female councilors is due to strategic positioning. I find that men are significantly more likely to run in the first or second of every five positions wherever quotas are applied, while they are simply more likely to be in the first and second position if there are no legislated gender quotas.
I estimate a null effect of legislated gender quotas on local public finance decisions, both in terms of the size of the local government and the composition of expenditures. This could be interpreted as a Median Voter result. Alternatively, I would advance the hypothesis that gender quotas do not cause a shift in priorities in municipal-level policy, because they do not cause a relevant increase in the percentage of women in municipal councils, a legislature that makes decisions based on majority rule. Moreover, candidate quotas do not increase the percentage of women that achieve the position of mayor, who has agenda setting power and makes a crucial input to decision making.
Another likely explanation is that, being responsible for the formation of the closed lists, party leaders impose party discipline in decisions over policy, as they can credibly punish legislators who deviate, ending their political carrier in the next elections.
Overall, the results in this paper warn against seeing gender quotas as a "panacea" for the low participation of women in politics. One of the main arguments for increasing female participation in politics is that the preferences of women, who constitute 50% of the electorate, are not adequately represented in male-dominated legislatures. However, while gender quotas that reserve important offices have proven successful in improving the representation of female preferences, the evidence from this paper shows that legislated candidate gender quotas cannot achieve as good a result.
If the goal of the introduction of gender quotas is a better representation of female preferences, a stronger focus on the percentage of women elected and the number of female mayors, rather than simply on female candidates, is needed; moreover, it would be relevant to limit the ability of the (usually male) elite of party leaders to influence policy decisions made by elected legislators, particularly in a proportional system with a closed list, which is the norm in Spain, where it is not the voter but the party leader who decides who will govern.
An understanding of the effect of candidate gender quotas on female promotion to legislative and executive roles and on policy outcomes is fundamental, to balance the benefits and costs of gender quotas themselves in a rigorous way, and indirectly to understand the evolution of a society where, although slowly, women are catching up in terms of accessing roles of responsibility.
Figure 3
Difference between after-reform and pre-reform probability of female mayors by population: local averages and polynomial fit.
Figure 4
Difference between after-reform and pre-reform measures of size of local government by population: local averages and polynomial fit.
Figure 5
Difference between after-reform and pre-reform local government composition by population: local averages and polynomial fit.
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Figure 7
Estimated density of the running variable after and before the reform.
Figure 8
Figure 9
T-Statistics from McCrary Test and cutoff of the running variable: the test estimates the discontinuity of the density at each of the hypothetical cutoffs. 
